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Case Comment
The Implications of Soo Mill and Lumber Co. Ltd. v. The
Corporation of the City of Sault Ste. Marie and Sanbay
Developments Ltd. v. The Corporation of The City of
London on Developent Control by Municipalities
By PAMELA M. BAGG*
The recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Soo Mill and Lumber
Co. Ltd. v. The Corporation of the City of Sault Ste. Marie1 and Sanbay
Developments Ltd. v. The Corporation of the City of London2 appear to have
effectively expanded the present acceptable limits of land use and develop-
ment control under The Planning Act.3 Before turning to the facts of these
cases, reference to the background of the relevant sections of the present
legislation is in order.
Pursuant to the Ontario government's general review of property law,
the Ontario Law Reform Commission requested that J. B. Milner examine
and evaluate present zoning mechanisms, in order to determine their suffi-
ciency to meet the needs of municipal planning. In his two reports, Tenta-
tive Proposals for the Reform of the Ontario Law Relating to Community
Planning and Land Use Control4 and Development Control, Some Less Ten-
tative Proposals,5 Milner concluded that present zoning mechanisms were
not sufficient. Specifically, he felt that the role of zoning had been misunder-
stood, and that zoning was being used in a manner not originally contem-
plated. The original purpose of zoning was to protect existing property values
and to prevent inappropriate uses from spoiling established areas. This is a
useful function in relation to those areas of a community that are relatively
stable. Therefore, the general zoning by-law is capable of assuring the in-
habitants that the stability will not be disturbed by some inappropriate mix
* Copyright, 1976, Pamela M. Bagg.
Pamela Bagg is a member of the 1977 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law
School.
1 [1975] 2 S.C.R. 78.
2 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 485.
3 R.S.O. 1970, c. 349 as am. 1971, c. 2; 1972, c. 118; and 1973, c. 168.
4 J. B. Milner, Tentative Proposals for the Reform of the Ontario Law Relating
to Community Planning and Land Use Control (Ontario Law Reform Commission,
1967).
5 J. B. Milner, Development Control: Some Less Tentative Proposals (Ontario Law
Reform Commission, 1969).
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of uses. Yet, instead of merely protecting existing property values, zoning
by-laws are also used to control development so that future property uses
and values can be projected. Thus, by-laws have acquired a dynamic func-
tion in addition to their normal static function. When used to regulate future
development, the results achieved by zoning by-laws are frequently unsatis-
factory. The 'crystal ball' seldom reveals what is the best that a private
developer may offer in the course of converting farmland to fully urbanized
land or redeveloping urbanized land to a much higher density area. Milner
felt that traditional zoning simply prevents the worst, but in doing so, fre-
quently prevents the best.0
In practical terms, municipal councils deliberately zone land in an in-
appropriate manner, in order to exert some control over unstable or un-
developed areas. While allowing some uses such as agriculture, they have
created an indirect holding zone until a developer requests an amendment
allowing his development. This spot-zoning technique is becoming more fre-
quent in an attempt to solve the problem of the rigidity of the traditional use
of zoning by-laws. Yet, it undermines the openness and certainty that the
public is entitled to expect from good planning and zoning. For example, of
415 by-laws in 41 municipalities, 316 or 76 per cent related to a single piece
or block of land, while 99 or 24 per cent were general zoning changes. This
frequency of amendment greatly discredits the argument that general zoning
gives absolute certainty.7
Therefore, Milner strongly recommended that when an area could be
identified as one that is likely to change, that area should be subject to a
different kind of control. To this end, he proposed several recommendations.
First, and most desirable, would be the implementation of a development
control zone in these areas. That is, the zoning power should be amended to
permit the designation of a use as permitted in a zone. Such designation would
be subject to approval of the planning director or zoning administrator, with
a right of appeal. Second, as a necessary intermediate step, councils should
be clearly authorized to prohibit all uses in any zone pending rezoning by
amendment, on application, or pending the adoption of a system of develop-
ment control by permit."
The Ontario Law Reform Commission gave serious consideration to the
recommendation of granting a separate development power to municipalities.
In its Report on Development Control, the Commission stated:
There is evidence of a need to be able to prohibit the use of land by private
individuals within a municipality or some areas within such municipalities until
a development plan can be worked out, and also to provide for the retention of
certain powers in council or some other body over details of development. The
commission has concluded however, not to make any major recommendations with
respect to overall development control nor with respect to the possible creation
0 Id. at 19-21.
7Id. at 13.
8 Id. at 42-43; supra, note 4 at 59.
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of a third level of regulation until such time as the more basic political, economic
and philosophical problems are resolved. 9
In proposing amendment to The Planning Act in 1973, the Ontario
legislature adopted the position of the Law Reform Commission concerning
development control. But although s. 35a was marginally noted as "de-
velopment control", it is, in reality, limited site plan control. In effect,
s. 35a(2) contemplates a traditional amending zoning by-law, but this
by-law would be able to provide that no building permit be issued until the
developer has agreed with the municipality, subject to OMB review, in res-
pect of the limited conditions listed therein. Section 35a merely provides a
statutory basis for enactment of an amending by-law which expresses a
municipality's permission for development of a particular site, and which
allows agreements made pursuant to the amending by-law. To interpret this
new section as establishing a statutory freeze on development until agreement
is reached with the municipality pursuant to s. 35a(4) (b) would seem in-
consistent with the legislative background of this amendment. Further, if the
legislature had intended to grant such a power to municipalities, it could
have done so by clear statutory language, as was done in The Niagara Es-
carpment Planning and Development Act.10
The most distinctive feature of The Niagara Escarpment Planning and
Development Act is its provision for development control instead of conven-
tional zoning. Section 22 specifically provides for areas of development con-
trol where all previous zoning is cancelled. Section 23 makes it clear that in
those areas, there is to be no development whatever without a permit setting
out certain conditions to be met in terms of land use. Therefore, the Ontario
legislature has acknowledged this method of development control in a clear
manner; it did not do so in relation to individual municipalities.
The Ontario legislature further recognized development control as a
system which provided great advantages not provided by zoning. As the
Hon. John White stated: "zoning can only anticipate average conditions.
Development control is flexible, permitting each proposal to be judged on its
own merits and controlled accordingly."" While the government recognized
these advantages, this is the only area where it chose to sanction such a
system. In The Parkway Belt Planning and Development Act,112 development
control was not included for the stated reason that the development pressures
there were too immediate and intense to allow time for the creation of objec-
tive criteria for development control'13
Therefore, despite the site plan control power given in s. 35a of The
9 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Development Control (Department
of Justice, 1971) at 11-12.
10 The Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, S.O. 1973, c. 52.
" The Hon. John White, "Ontario Land Use Legislation", in The Special Lectures
of the Law Society of Upper Canada, The Changing Face of Land Use and Develop-
ment (Toronto: Richard De Boo Ltd., 1974) 121 at 127.
12 The Parkvay Belt Planning and Development Act, S.O. 1973, c. 53.
1s Supra, note 11.
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Planning Act, and in the absence of explicit legislative authority to utilize
direct development control, municipalities must still resort to indirect methods
of spot-zoning and inappropriate use zoning in order to achieve some sem-
blance of control. The Ontario Economic Council was critical of s. 35a in
that it failed to establish clear machinery to be utilized by designated munici-
palities desiring to exercise the new powers. 14 Rather, it adopted the stand
taken by I. B. Milner, that the alternative method of development control
is necessary in areas of growth and change, and that any system of indivi-
dualized development control requires a freezing of the owner's right to
make development decisions without official approval.' 5
Against this background, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its
decisions in Soo Mill and Lumber Co. Ltd. v. The Corporation of The City
of Sault Ste. Marie and Sanbay Developments Ltd. v. The Corporation of
The City of London. The decisions appear to sanction the very activity of
development control via land freezes which had been legislatively rejected as
a power available to municipalities. In the absence of statutory limits, the
potential implications of this judicially approved power may be far reaching.
The case of Soo Mill and Lumber Co. Ltd. v. The Corporation of The
City of Sault Ste. Marie involved an attempt by the city to delay premature
development in certain areas by placing a holding category on designated
uses until the areas appeared ready for such development, and until the
standards appropriate to the designated uses could be satisfied. To this end,
the Official Plan set out the following policy guideline:
Zoning By-Law
The implementing Zoning By-Law will translate the intent and policies of the
Official Plan into appropriate legal regulations applicable to land and land uses
in the entire planning area. Certain Areas designated for specific land uses on the
Official Plan may be zoned otherwise under a "holding category" in order to delay
their development for their designated use until they appear to be ready for such
development and until the standards appropriate to the designated use can be
satisfied. Under the "holding category" the land use may be zoned agricultural
use, for parks or recreational use, for open space use, for other temporary uses,
for existing uses (preferably with a restriction prohibiting all enlargement) or their
designated use with a suffix "H" to indicate a temporary holding status. Prior to
zoning lands under a holding category, the municipality shall be satisfied that
the use permitted by such zoning will not exert any adverse effect upon any
adjacent existing use, will not jeopardize the future development of the land in
conformity with the Official Plan designation and that all services deemed necessary
are provided. When council receives application for a development project which
is deemed suitable by, and which is in accordance with the designation and policies
of the Official Plan, the holding category may be removed from the implementing
by-law by an amendment to the plan. 16
Pursuant to the Official Plan, the municipality passed implementing By-law
4500, which designated certain lands R.M. 10, which had been previously
14 Report of the Ontario Economic Council, in The Special Lectures of the Law
Society of Upper Canada, The Changing Face of Land Use and Development (Toronto:
Richard De Boo Ltd., 1974) 98 at 107.
15 1d. at 108.
16 Supra, note 1 at 79-80.
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zoned 'residential' under the Official Plan. Section 23 of the by-law set out
the permitted uses under the R.M. 10 category (which included triplex
dwelling, apartment dwelling and multiple attached dwelling), and the ne-
cessary requirements of, and standards for, such building development. How-
ever, as the designated property was not considered ready for development
when By-law 4500 was passed, the suffix 'H' (holding category) was added
to the zone designation. Section 40 of the by-law stated that the land, while
in that category could only be used for cultivation of land, production of field
crops, market gardening, grazing and home occupation. A property owner
whose land was placed in this category brought suit to declare the holding
designation void on three grounds. In the first place, it amounted to a total
prohibition of land use.17 Secondly, as the designation envisaged an ultimate
repeal, it was temporary in nature and thus beyond the scope of the munici-
pality. Finally, it amounted to zoning by permit rather than through a by-law
setting out permitted uses. At trial, O'Driscoll, I. held that:
A zoning by-law which places lands in a holding category in order to delay their
development for their designated use until they appear to be ready for develop-
ment and until the standards appropriate to the designated use can be satisfied
and which restricts the use to which the lands may be put to certain limited
purposes until the holding category is removed is a temporary zoning by-law
and is not authorized by s. 35(1) and (2) of The Planning Act.18
l'his decision is consistent with the case of Re Kerr and the Township of
Brock, and the position expressed in Re Bridgman and the City of Toronto:
[E]veryone has a right to use his own property in any way that he may see fit
so long as he does nothing that will be a legal nuisance to his neighbours. That
is a common law right. One must place a strict construction on any statute or
by-law which is restrictive in the nature of the liberty of the subject or the liberty
with which he may exercise those rights that the common law gives to him over
his property.' 9
Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada departed
from this position. Jessup, l.A. adopted the reasoning expressed in Re Bruce
and the City of Toronto:
Ontario Courts now accept that the obligation imposed on the municipal councils
to plan for the growth and development of the community demands recognition
of the necessity for means to compel the observance of the right of the community
to determine and enforce the direction in which the community should be shaped,
37The courts have made it clear that the authority vested by s. 35(1) of The
Planning Act will not support the absolute prohibition of the use of land for any
purpose. This principle was explained in Re Kerr and the Township of Brock, [1968]
2 O.k. 509 at 511 in that:
inhere is no right of absolute prohibition contained in s. 30(1) (now s. 35(1) )
mentioned, but merely a right to regulate even though the regulating may be
done positively, by forbidding certain uses or negatively, by forbidding all uses
not mentioned in the by-law.
The only limited statutory exception to this is contained in s. 35(3) of The Planning
Act whereby a municipality may prohibit the erection of buildings on flood plain or
hazard land where services could not be properly provided.
18Soo Mill and Lumber Co. Ltd. v. The Corporation of the City of Sault Ste.
Marie, [1972] 3 O.R. 621 at 621 (H.C.).
19 [1951] O.1. 489 at 496.
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and that in this regard the rights of the community are paramount to the rights
of the owner 2 0
Laskin, CJ.C. adopted the position that planning policies should be liberally
rather than strictly construed. Therefore, in deciding whether the holding
category amounted to a practical freeze or prohibition of the use to which
this individual could put his land, the court stated that one must look beyond
the individual use to see whether everyone affected was in fact frozen or steri-
lized in his land use. In this case, although the individual in question might
not be able to use his land in the manner designated, the fact that agricultural
and related uses were permitted did not amount to a general prohibition.2'
Further as the holding designation was an implementation of an overall Offi-
cial Plan and a general zoning by-law, the individual had no basis for claim-
ing discrimination.
In connection with the allegation that a municipality may not enact such
a holding category for a temporary period, Laskin, C.IC. clearly stated that
the power to enact is equally the power to repeal. The fact that a by-law
contains, within its terms, provisions that envisage changes therein by the
enacting authority, does not mean that one municipal council has withdrawn
discretion from a successor, either as to the continuation of the by-law or
as to its amendment at a particular time.2s
Therefore, it is clear from this decision that municipalities now have
the power to place lands in a temporary holding category, which, while al-
lowing some use of the land, can be inappropriate for particular individuals.
However, the decision raises two serious questions. First, for what purposes
has the court authorized 'holding zones' to be used? Second, by what means
and by application of what criteria is the 'holding zone' to be lifted?
There are two purposes for which a 'holding category' may be used.
The first is as an interim or stop-gap measure, designed to provide time to
enable a municipality to introduce permanent comprehensive zoning regula-
tions.2 3 In such a case, the municipality is uncertain about the type of de-
velopment it wishes to see in a given area and, therefore, finds it desirable
to stop all further development while reviewing and, more likely, changing
the use in the area. The second purpose is as a timing device to prevent
premature development.24 That is to say, the Municipal Council has decided
upon the proper designated development for an area, but feels that develop-
ment should not proceed until the area is provided with proper services. In
this case, the permitted use before and after the implementation of the hold-
ing category will be the same. In the Soo Mill case, Laskin, C.J.C. clearly
authorized the latter function for a holding by-law. Since the Official Plan
and the implementing by-law set out the appropriate designation and re-
20 [1971] 3 O.R. 62 at 67.
21 Supra, note 1 at 84.
Id. at 85.
2 3 Ian Rogers, Canadian Law of Planning and Zoning (Toronto: Carswell Co.
Ltd. 1973) at 21.
24 1d. at 21.
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quirements for the property, a holding category passed pursuant to, and
within the confines of, such a structure only has the effect of delaying already
approved development. Laskin stated that the removal of the suffix "H", as
contemplated by the Official Plan would leave the property zoned R.M. 10
(as before the 'Hold') and the appellant would then be able to proceed with
a development under that category without the requirement of any further
permit respecting land use. 2 Although it is true that once the hold is lifted,
no further permission is required, nevertheless, the court neglected to specify
any criteria to be used in determining whether, and when, the holding cate-
gory will be lifted.
The only reference to specific criteria which Laskin, C.J.C. makes is
that, in general, he does not regard it as legally objectionable that the re-
moval of the suffix may have to be prompted by an application for a devel-
opment project conforming to the Official Plan.26 However, he then fails to
explain why he sees no such legal objection. Construed narrowly, the judg-
ment holds that when a developer has met all the criteria set out in s. 23 of
the implementing by-law, the municipality has no residual discretion to re-
fuse permission. It must lift the holding category. This was clearly the belief
of Jessup, l.A. in the Court of Appeal. He stated that the holding category
would remain until such a time as the property was considered ready or ma-
ture for development, in accordance with s. 23 of the by-law.27 This position
is also consistent with s. 35(3) of The Planning Act which states that:
A by-law may prohibit the use of land or the erection or use of buildings or
structures unless such municipal services as may be set out in the by-law are
available to service the land, buildings, or structures as the case may be.
If this is the case, then the decision does not go beyond that of Verdun v. Sun
Oil Co. Ltd.28 This method of time-controlled sequential zoning, in accord-
ance with an Official Plan and the requirements of the implementing by-law,
via the use of temporary holding zones, is consistent with planning principles.
Indeed, it is desirable in undeveloped areas to prevent premature inadequate
development.2 9
2 5 Supra, note 1 at 83.
2 6 Supra, note 1 at 84.
27 Soo Mill and Lumber Co. Ltd. v. The Corporation of the City of Sault Ste.
Marie, [1973] 2 O.R. 110 at 115 (C.A.).
28 [1952] 1 S.C.R. 222.
29 It has been expressed that the freezing of development for all practical purposes
by placing land in a 'holding category' amounts to expropriation without compensation.
However, it is interesting to note, that in the United States, where the rights of property
are constitutionally protected, this type of 'time-controlled sequential zoning' has been
approved by the courts. In Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, (N.Y.) 285 N.E.
2d. 291 (N.Y.), a moratorium was placed on development and the sequence of develop-
ment was paced in relation to the city's capacity to furnish adequate public facilities
and services. The plan covered an 18 year period. In the interim, any developer who
wished to proceed had to accumulate development points which were clearly set out
in the statute. No special permit would issue until 15 development points had been
accumulated. The courts upheld the statute. This represents the first time that any court
in the U.S. has upheld the concept of restrictive development through comprehensive
planning or the exercise of the zoning power without compensation. For a further
analysis see: Benson Blank, Time Control, Sequential Zoning, Baylor L.R., 25:318; 35.
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However, failure by the Supreme Court to specify the criteria to be used
by municipalities in determinifig when the holding category must be lifted
leaves the decision open to a much broader interpretation. The language of
the Official Plan appears to vest a residual discretion in the council beyond
those criteria listed in the implementing by-law. The critical passage states:
[W]hen council receives application for a development project which is deemed
suitable by council and which is in accordance with the designation and policies
of the Official Plan, the holding category may be removed from the implementing
by-law by an amending by-law without any need for any amendment to the Plan.
(emphasis added)30
Therefore, it is open to question, in the absence of judicially imposed
limitations, whether the development must not only meet the criteria in the
Official Plan, but must also be "deemed suitable" by the council. Further-
more, notwithstanding that either or both conditions are met, council is still
not required to lift the holding category as the by-law provides that council
"may", not "must", remove it. The direction is not mandatory. If this broad
interpretation is correct, it would appear to vest councils with the right to
exercise their discretion in determining whether individual developments are
"deemed suitable", regardless of whether the criteria in the Official Plan and
the implementing by-law have been met. This method of municipal develop-
ment control by a permit system was expressly rejected by the Provincial
legislature as being inappropriate.
The foregoing analysis is further supported by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Sanbay Developments Ltd. v. The Corporation
of the City of London. In that case, a general zoning by-law had zoned cer-
tain lands suitable for multi-family dwellings. Among the permitted uses of
land in that zone was apartment buildings containing six or more dwelling
units, provided such apartment buildings met the regulatons contained in the
accompanying section of the by-law. The city later passed an amendment to
this by-law called 'Holding Regulation' which repealed the prior governing
regulations. The amendment further stated that there should be no multi-
family dwellings (three or more units) in the area until the by-law should be
amended to provide details concerning permitted building areas, parking
areas, open space, external design and regulations governing the size, floor
area, and character and use of such buildings. In the interim, a developer who
wished to place a multi-family dwelling on his property, which was subject to
the by-law, was advised that he could not get a permit unless he obtained an
amendment to the existing zoning by-law allowing the development he sought.
What criteria were to be used to judge his development? Clearly, there were
none set out in the by-law. However, the Supreme Court of Canada stated
that the 'Holding Regulation' could not be read as reserving to the munici-
pality an overriding authority to require any owner of land who desired to
put it to a permitted use, in accordance with applicable standards and con-
trols, to satisfy other ad hoc requirements which the municipality might im-
pose in the particular case. 31 The Court must have believed that the city
30 Supra, note 1 at 80.
81 Supra, note 2 at 492.
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contemplated an interim delay until a general amending by-law dealing with
those matters listed in s. 35(1) (4) (b) of The Planning Act was passed.
With due respect to the Court, the City of London likely had not the slightest
intention of doing what was contemplated. Since there was no explicit re-
quirement in the decision that a general by-law with the proper regulations
be passed within a given time period, the city could sit idle with its holding
by-law as long as it wanted. In the meantime, developers would have to seek
specific rezoning in the form of individual by-laws to permit the erection of
each individual development3 2 There would be no objective criteria to guide
the developer in drafting his plans and no guarantee that the municipality
would not change its policies between applications. This method of develop-
ment control via permit can be seen as being broader than that in other
enabling legislation on development control, because it lacks any objective
standards by which to judge individual developments.
The arbitrariness and discrimination to which this broadly interpreted
judicial power is open is evident, as illustrated in the Supreme Court of On-
tario's decision in Re Fairmeadow Developments and The Town of Markham.33
In that case, the Township of Markham, pursuant to its Official Plan, placed
certain designated lands in a 'rural residential zone', excepting the Village of
Unionville, which had not been included in the Official Plan study. However, in
1971, the township planners felt it was necessary to place some control on the
Village until studies to determine the ultimate use of lands situate there could be
completed. Therefore, they placed Unionville under the same 'rural residen-
tial' zone. However, as this area was never included in the Official Plan, it
was necessary to amend the Official Plan after the fact, but only to the extent
of specifying the basic policy of holding these lands. Neither the by-law nor
the subsequent amendment to the Official Plan had been approved by the
Ontario Municipal Board. The Ontario High Court upheld the by-law on the
basis that the Soo Mill and the Sanbay Developments decisions sanctioned the
use of a temporary zoning by-law which did not absolutely prohibit all land
use affected by it, provided such by-law implemented planning objectives.84
Yet, there is a great difference between a holding by-law passed pursuant to
a system of approvals and checks connected with the adoption of the Official
Plan, the planning policies reflected in such a plan and in by-laws implement-
ing it (as was contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Soo Mill
case) and one which is passed pursuant to no general Official Plan or im-
plementing by-law, and which, unlike the Soo Mill case and the Sanbay De-
velopments case, will likely result in a complete change of land use when
the holding zone is lifted. Again, in light of the absence of a time limitation
and objective standards by which to judge developments to be built in the
interim, municipalities are vested with an unbridled discretion not contem-
plated by the present Planning Act.
2 This opinion has also been expressed by Peter Betts, Q.C., "Recent Trends in
Land Use Control with Particular Reference to 1973 Ontario Legislation", in The
Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, The Changing Face of Land
Use and Development (Toronto: Richard De Boo Ltd., 1974) 83 at 88.
33 [1973] 3 O.R. 144.
34 Id. at 152.
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The Ontario Municipal Board addressed itself to this very issue in Re
Toronto Official Plan Amendment, 5 commonly known as the '45 ft. height
by-law'. Here, the City of Toronto, wishing to study further downtown de-
velopment, passed a by-law and a subsequent amendment to the Official Plan
to limit buildings to 45 feet in height and a gross floor area of 40,000 square
feet. It was also clearly expressed that during the hold period, amendments
arising out of individual applications, based on standards acceptable to the
city and the local community, could be made. The by-law stated in part that:
[I]t would be intended within each area designated for development control to
require that each permit application for a principal building be subject to plan-
ning review before the issuance of a building permit. These controls would be in
the absolute discretion of council and would be subject to the OMB considera-
tion only in the event of appeal. 36
Both the OMB and the Ontario Cabinet held the by-law and amendment to
the Official Plan ultra vires. In doing so, they stressed that this holding by-
law was not passed pursuant to, and within the confines of, the Official Plan.
Hence, if this amendment were adopted, it would give the council the right
to pass land use restriction, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Offi-
cial Plan.37 More importantly, they felt that the council had failed to discern
the difference between review of zoning by-laws from time to time and review
of individual applications by council with unbridled discretion. The total
failure of the city to establish objective criteria for exemption, and the at-
tempt to substitute the subjective opinion of council in place of objective cri-
teria would be open to abuse. As the Hon. D'Arcy McKeough, Treasurer
of Ontario, stated:
The criteria must be public information so that a property owner may have the
basis on which decisions affecting his property are being made so that he may
be reasonably confident of fair and equitable treatment and so that he may
exercise his lawful rights in the event of a dispute.38
The situation in this case raises the same problems as the decisions in
Fairmeadows, Soo Mill and Sanbay Developments. The OMB has properly
recognized that the power of municipalities to implement development con-
trol via a permit system, especially in the absence of any objective guide-
lines, is beyond the scope and intention of The Planning Act. However, it is
evident from the language used in all cases, that the ability to put a tempor-
ary hold on an area, to permit the completion of planning studies leading to
the development of new planning standards or devices, is a legitimate ob-
jective.30 It is the manner of attaining these objectives which is of concern.
The courts have allowed a method which has been explicitly withheld from
municipalities by the legislature. In doing so, they have left the door open to
wide discretion. Therefore, if the need for development control is recognized,
as it clearly has been, then it is imperative that the legislature implement
statutory perimeters to limit this judicially sanctioned power, in order to
create a more open, equitable and dynamic planning system.
30 Re Toronto Official Plan Amendment [1975], 4 O.M.B.R. 222.
-10 Id. at 226.
3 7 Id. at 233.
, Id. at 223.
30 Supra, note 1 at 82; supra, note 35 at 223.
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